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Workmen's Compensation - Going and Comng Rule
is generally prohibited from representing clients with conflicting inter-
ests ,7 Moreover, the court considered the matter of advertising.
The defendant title companies often advertised, holding out to the public
that there were lawyers on their staff, which, as to the lawyer-employee,
exceeded the limitaton of the Canons.! Thus, the employment of law-
yers did not afford the title compames a means by which to circumvent
the prohibition against the corporate practice of law.
The second argument, though not original,9 involved the full disclo-
sure theory which the court accepted. This theory postulates that when
a client deals with one neither a lawyer nor one governed by the code of
ethics to which the lawyer is subject, the client is not assured the full dis-
dosure of the effects of legal transactions to which he is a party and to
which he is entitled. To the same effect, in dealing with the lawyer-em-
ployee a client deals with one whose principal motivation is the interest of
his corporate employer. Thus, the art of conveyancing when practiced
by the lawyer-employee or by the non-lawyer businessman is deleterious
to the public interest and should be proscribed.
Clearly law must not be practiced by those who would profit by
its administration. The present decision is motivated by this high ideal.
There is, however, a dispute as to whether conveyancing is a matter which
ought to be reserved to the legal profession."0 Nonetheless, the present
holding is a step forward in the direction of what Dean Pound refers to as
a "resurgence of professionalism."11 The prospect of more cases reaching
the same conclusion as the present case may be limited by the practical
considerations of expense and of the availability of attorneys."
JOHN R. FERGUSON
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - GOING AND COMING RULE AS
APPLIED TO POLICEMEN
Simerlink v. Young, 172 Ohto St. 427, 178 N.E.2d 168 (1961)
Plaintiff, a police officer, while in uniform and carrying his service
revolver, billy dub, flashlight, keys, whistle, and other incidents of his
employment, was injured in an automobile accident while driving to
7. 90 Ariz. 76, 90, 366 P.2d 1, 11 (1961).
8. Canons 27, 35, 47, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETICS.
9. This argument was advanced in Beach Abstract & Guaranty Company v. Bar Association
of Arkansas, 203 Ark. 494, 501, 326 S.W.2d 900, 903 (1959).
10. See Buchignan, The Practice of Law - Why It Is a Profession, 41 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y
179 (1958).
11. POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY To MODERN TIMES 362 (1953).
12. Cf. Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 398, 312 P.2d 998
(1957). The Colorado court in sustaining conveyancing by non-lawyer realtors predicated
its holding on the practical considerations of expense and of the lack of attorneys in a number
of counties of that state.
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work. The Supreme Court of Ohio,' disregarding the fact that a police
officer is at all tunes charged with the duty to preserve and maintain law
and order, denied compensation on the ground that the injury did not arise
out of or in the course of employment.
Ordinarily, injuries sustained while going to or coming from work
are not compensable.2 Workmen's compensation statutes are not in-
tended to protect the worker against all perils of the journey. However,
"in course of employment" is not confined to the actual manipulation
of the tools of work.8
In 1923 the United States Supreme Court in Cudahy Packing Com-
pany v Parramore4 announced that an injury arising out of the employ-
ment could be shown by proving that there was a "causal connection
between the injury and the business a connection substantially con-
tributory though it need not be the sole proximate cause" and that "no
exact formula can be laid down which will automatically solve every
case."5  The Cudahy Packing Company decision gave rise to many excep-
tions that have been engrafted onto the "going and coming" rule. Ex-
ceptions applicable to the Simerlink case which permit recovery for in-
juries sustained are: (1) when traveling is part of the job,6 (2) when the
employee is subject to call,7 (3) when the undertaking is consistent with
the employer's contract for hire' and which in some logical manner per-
1. Simerlink v. Young, 172 Ohio St. 427, 178 N.E.2d 168 (1961).
2. 42 OHIO JUR. Workmen's Compensation § 53 (1936)
3. 1 LARsoN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 15.11 (1952)
4. 263 U.S. 418 (1923)
5. Id. at 423-24.
6. When traveling is part of the employment, the employee will be considered in the course
of employment from the time he leaves home until he returns. 8 ScHNEEDER, WORKMEN'S
COMPWNSATION § 1737 (3d ed. 1951). See also Healey v. Hudson Coal Company, 130
Pa. Super. 462, 198 At. 684 (1938), where a police lieutenant was injured while returning
home; the court held that for purposes of compensation under the Workmen s Compensation
Act his duties began when he left home and ended when he returned. Pennsylvania defines
"injury" to include all "injuries sustained while the employee is actually engaged in the fur-
therance of the employers business "" PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 301(c) (1950).
7 Voehl v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 288 U.S. 162 (1933) However, Ohio follows the rule
that "subject to call" is not an exception to the "going and coming rule." Cardwell v. In-
dustrial Comm n, 155 Ohio St. 466, 99 N.E.2d 306 (1951) When an employee has finished
his work and is on his way home, on a mission of his own, and is injured at a place where he
is not required to be by his employment, it makes no difference whether he works regular
hours or is subject to call by the employer. Richtarik v. Bors, 142 Neb. 226, 5 N.W.2d
399 (1942) This view has been criticized on the ground that to make an award only
when the employee is working gives hun no greater protection than the worker with set hours
who has the remainder of the day free from employment. 41 NED. L. REV. 52 (1961)
8. The Supreme Court of Tennessee held in Town of Tullahoma v. Ward, 173 Tenn. 91,
114 S.W.2d 804 (1938), that a police officer in uniform, while walking home, was charged
with the duty to preserve peace and order and, therefore, regardless of his immediate or ulti-
mate destination, was in the scope of his employment. The Workmen's Compensation Act
of Tennessee, like that of Ohio, limits "injury" to one resulting from an accident arising out
of and in the course of employment. TENN. CODE § 50-902(d) (1956)
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tains to or is incidental to his employment, (4) when the employee is
furthering the employer's business,'0 or, (5) when the injury results from
a hazard of the employee's work."
The causal connection between employment and injury defined by
the United States Supreme Court in Cudahy Packing Company v. Parra-
more"1 was found to exist in Sweat v. Allen" where a police officer
was, injured while going to work. The court in the Sweat case reasoned
that even though the injury occurs while the police officer is going to
work, the same causal connection exists as when a police officer is injured
while attempting to arrest a drunken driver.' 4
Ohio follows the general rule that injuries are not compensable when
an employee is injured while going to or from work where such employee
has a fixed and limited working place.' 5 An exception to this rule is
when the employee is still charged, while on his way to or after reaching
home, with some duty'5 or task in connection with his employment.
7
9. In Kyle v. Green High School, 208 Iowa 1037, 226 N.W. 71 (1929), compensation
was granted where an employee, although not at his regular place of employment and before
or after customary working hours, was discharging some duty incidental to the nature of 
his
employment in the interest of, or under direction of, his employer. See also Smith v. Industrial
Comm'n, 107 N.E.2d 220 (Ohio Ct. App. 1948).
10. "Furthering the employer's business" has been applied in such situations as: where 
an
employee was injured on Sunday while going home after church to get a key to check his
employer's furnace, Kromley v. Board of Educ., 13 N.J. Misc. 627, 180 At. 546 (Work-
men's Compensation Bureau 1935); where an employee was injured going to work after
receiving a phone call at home to go to work, Kyle v. Green High School, spra note 9;
where the employee was returning home to phone in sales order after his day's service was
completed, Bachman v. Waterman, 68 Ind. App. 580, 121 N.E. 8 (1918); where an em-
ployee was returning home with an empty water can belonging to his employer to fill and take
it back in the morning, Ince v. Chester Westfall Drilling Co., 346 P.2d 346 (Okla. 1959);
and where an employee was to pick up tools, Muir v. Wilson, 194 Pa. Super. 487, 168 A.2d
588 (1961).
11. Souza's Case, 316 Mass. 332, 55 N.E.2d 611 (1944). The court held that a traveling
repairman's death was compensable when he was burned while sleeping in a public boarding
house,' for his employment brought him in contact with the risk that caused his death.
12. 263 U.S. 418 (1923).
13. 145 Fla. 733, 200 So. 348 (1942). The Florida statute contains wording similar to that
found in section 4123.01 (c) of the Ohio Revised Code. Florida Statutes Annotated section
440.02(6) (1952) provides: "The term 'injury' means personal injury or death by accident
arising out of and in the course of employment ....
14. Id. at 735, 200 So. at 351. The mere fact that a policeman is required to hold himself
ready to perform'certain duties at any hour of the day and night is insufficient to place him
in the performance of his duties. To hold otherwise, would be to allow compensation, even
if the injury is received while he is at home or at a party or on a personal mission.
15. 42 Omo Jut- Workman's Compensation S 53 (1936). The theory for excluding
employees from the benefits of workmen's compensation while "going to or coming from
work" is that they are not performing any service for their employer and are exposed to risk,
not as employees, but as members of the general public. To award compensation for injuries
received while going to or from work without any evidence that the cause of the injury arose
out of the work, .would convert the compensation plan into an insurance against injuries
wherever and however received. Baumbach v. Industrial Comm'n, 59 Ohio App. 101, 17
N.E.2d 389 (1938).
16. The Supreme Court of Ohio held in State ex re!. Schoedinger v. Lentz, 132 Ohio St. 50,
5 N.B.2d 167 (1936), that "duty" embraces all manner of duty imposed upon a police officer,
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In other words, if the employee is furthering the employer's business at
the tune of the injury,'8 that injury arises out of and in the course of his
employment.
Thus, a causal connection between the harm received and the
employment must exist. 9  The Supreme Court of Ohio has said that
a causal connection exists if it is apparent to the rationale mind, upon
consideration of all circumstances, that there is a proximate causal con-
nection between the conditions under which the work is required to be
performed and the resulting injury 20 Also the Ohio courts have awarded
compensation where the injury follows as a natural incident of the work
and as a result of exposure occasioned by the nature, condition, or sur-
rounding of the employment."' Such an exposure has been defined as a
hazard of the employment 2 peculiar to the work and not common to the
general public in the community."3 The criterion to determine what is
peculiar to the work is not whether others are exposed to the same dan-
gers of travel. The test is whether, with reference to the nature of em-
ployment, performance of special service within the scope of such em-
ployment and in interest of, or by direction of, the employer peculiarly
subjects the employee t6 added dangers out of which the accident
occurs.24 Thus, in the Simmerlink case the Ohio Supreme Court drew a
rather fine distinction between anticipatory duty and actual performance
of duty as to police officers.
RICHARD B. MoRITz
independent of the question of time, place, or manner of person. Lentz, a police officer, was
killed while cleaning his service revolver at home. The court reasoned that a police officer
who does an act, which by standing department rule or order he is under obligation to do, is
engaged in the performance of his duty.
17 Stevens v. Industrial Comm n, 145 Ohio St. 198, 61 N.E.2d 198 (1945)
18. "Furthering the employers business" has been applied in such cases as: cranking a car
at home which has been furnished by the employer, Industrial Comm n v. Wilson, 34 Ohio
App. 36, 170 N.E. 37 (1939); sustaining injury while returning home with days receipts
for safekeeping, Standard Oil Co. v. Clark, 44 Ohio App. 211, 184 NE. 861 (1933)
19. Maynard v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 144 Ohio St. 22, 56 N.E.2d 195 (1944).
20. Highway Oil Co. v. State ex rel. Bricker, 130 Ohio St. 175, 198 N_E. 276 (1935).
However, an earlier case, Fassig v. State ex rel. Turner, 95 Ohio St. 232, 116 N.E. 104 (1917),
appears to modify this definition. The rule announced in the Fasstg case apparently would not
cover any case where the cause of injury was outside of and disconnected with the employment,
although the employee may at the time have been engaged in doing the work of his employer
in the usual way.
21. Sebek v. Cleveland Graphite & Bronze Co., 148 Ohio St. 693, 76 N.E.2d 892 (1948)
22. Tipplie v. High St. Co., 70 Ohio App. 397, 41 N.E.2d 879 (1942).
23. Walborn v. General Fire-Proofing Co., 147 Ohio St. 507, 72 N.E.2d 95 (1947). In the
case of workmen whose duties are such that they are obliged to be continuously upon the
street in the course of their employment, some courts make a distinction upon the theory
that the very nature of the employment subjects them to the street dangers more than persons
generally are subjected to and consequently injuries from such dangers must be considered as
arising out of and in the course of the employment. See Annot., 1916A L.R.A. 314.
24. Smith v. Industrial Comm'n, supra note 9.
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